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Abstract: The transposition of EU law into national law is a significant part of the EU policy 
process.  However, political scientists haven’t devoted to it the attention that it deserves.  The 
author, a political scientist, construes transposition as a part of the wider process of policy 
implementation.  Following implementation theory from the field of public policy, the article 
outlines three sets of factors (institutional, political and substantive) that affect transposition.  
Secondly, the article examines the manner in which eight member states transpose EU 
legislation and identifies a European style of transposition.  Following institutional theory in 
political science, it is argued that this style isn’t the result of a process of convergence.  
Rather, it stems from the capacity of institutions to adapt to novel situations by means of their 
own standard operating procedures and institutional repertoires.  It concludes by 
highlighting the partial nature of efforts at EU level to improve transposition, themselves 
impaired by the politics of the policy process.   
 
I Introduction 
 The EU is a law-intensive organisation1.  However, a significant proportion of the 
laws that it produces need to be transposed-that is incorporated-into national legislation in 
order to produce their full effects.  Political scientists and lawyers could benefit from each 
others’ work with regard to the process of European integration but the dialogue between 
them has remained rather limited.  The transposition of EU law into national law is an area 
where this dialogue could be particularly fruitful.  It has remained a major issue in the EU2 
despite the learning process that inevitably underpins membership of the EU and the 
increasing attempts to fill functional gaps resulting from the fact that the EU is a loosely-
coupled implementation structure3.  The increased legislative output resulting from the run-
up to the establishment of the Single European Market on the one hand, and the expansion of 
the EC/EU’s agenda on the other, have highlighted what could be termed ‘transposition 
deficit’.  The ineffective, belated and frequently non-existent transposition of directives into 
national law has been construed as a major problem even in areas where integration has 
reached much more advanced stages, such as the Single Market which became the vehicle for 
the re-launch of the process of integration since the mid-1980s.  In late 1997, the percentage 
rate of non-transposition of public procurement directives was 55.6%, 60% percent in the 
transport sector, 50% in intellectual and industrial property, 38% in the environmental sector 
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and 33.3% in technical harmonisation4.  In effect, transposition has become what Pressman 
and Wildavsky5 called ‘decision point’ where a ‘clearance’ is required for the 
implementation of the policy embodied in a directive.   
This is so despite the ruling of the European Court of Justice in the Francovich case6 
and the role of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties7.  Moreover, the transposition 
deficit seems more paradoxical in light of the customary practices of the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers used in the policy formulation stage of the EU policy process.  While 
the former always tries to avoid the establishment of minorities between the member states, 
the latter makes consensual decisions even when qualified majority voting can be used.  Why 
do member states whose interests seem not to be neglected in policy formulation fail to 
transpose EU legislation?   
 Transposition has a clear ‘technical’ (i.e. legal) dimension that focuses on the issue of 
clarity of EU legislation.  Indeed, criticism at the national level deplored the lack of precision 
in EU law and the fact that ‘there are everywhere holes which the judges have to fill in’8.  
Vagueness is indeed an issue per se in the sense that it obliges national officials to make 
difficult choices when they transpose EU law into national legislation.  Nevertheless, one 
should not over-estimate its importance at least because ‘an analysis of the case law of the 
[European] Court shows a relatively small number of cases where the real issue is one of 
interpretation of a secondary Community law in isolation’9.   
However, transposition involves a number of difficult choices.  These choices aren’t 
made in a vacuum.  Rather, they are affected by interests, institutions and individuals, i.e. 
they are political.  Therefore it is argued that even if vagueness ceases to be a problem, 
transposition will not necessarily improve.  This is so because transposition is a part of the 
wider process of policy implementation10.  Implementation theory in political science stresses 
the fact that implementation isn’t the orderly and neat follow-up to the formulation stage.  
Rather, ‘implementation is the continuation of politics by other means’11 in the EU as well 
where ‘post-decisional politics’12 is a dominant feature of the policy process.  Although 
clarity is a significant source of problems, it is argued that it is only one of the factors that 
affect transposition.  Following implementation theory, the discussion in the first section of 
the article examines three types of factors that affect transposition: institutional, political (in 
the strict sense of the term) and substantive.   
 How EU law is actually transposed in the member states is largely determined by 
national constitutional rules.  The principle of institutional autonomy-that is the right of the 
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member states to perform the tasks that stem from membership of the EU on the basis of their 
own constitutional rules-embodied in the definition of the directive (art. 249 of the Treaty) 
and enunciated by the ECJ in the early 1970s13 besides its normative content,14 is meant to 
facilitate transposition-and ‘street-level’ implementation-by taking into account national 
‘peculiarities’.  Given that national institutions embody traditions underpinned by historically 
defined processes, one would expect significant differences between member states.  
However, the analysis of the national mechanisms and procedures used for the transposition 
of EU law demonstrates remarkably similar patterns and only small differences of degree 
rather than substance.  Arguably, there is a European style of transposition.   
More importantly, these similarities aren’t the result of a process of convergence 
because the national procedures and mechanisms used for the transposition of EU law have 
changed only marginally.  Indeed, institutional theory in organisational analysis and political 
science underlines the fact that institutions don’t change easily.  Rather, they adapt to external 
pressures (in this case the obligation to transpose EU law under the guidance of the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ and the watchful eye of the European Commission) primarily by 
approaching ‘reality’ by means of their own standard operating procedures, institutional 
repertoires and codes15.  It will be argued that despite the functional pressure that stems from 
the exigencies of transposition, member states have essentially maintained their institutional 
autonomy.  Therefore, the second section examines the precise content of the principle of 
institutional autonomy, identifies the choices made by national authorities in transposition 
and outlines the European style of transposition based on evidence from France, the UK, 
Italy, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland and Sweden.   
 
II Unpacking Transposition 
A Lessons from Implementation Theory 
 Policy implementation isn’t the neat and orderly carrying out of authoritative 
decisions taken in the stage of policy formulation.  Rather, ‘the bargaining and maneuvering, 
the pulling and hauling of the policy-adoption process carries over into the policy-
implementation process’16.  Precisely because of the legally binding nature of directives, the 
deadlines for their transposition and the existence of institutionalised ‘fixers’ like the 
European Commission and the ECJ, the politics of transposition is likely to be very similar to 
the politics of the wider implementation process which is highly defensive17 in the sense that 
pressure on the officials who transpose EU law will primarily focus on mitigating-or even 
defeating altogether-the unwanted consequences of that law.   
Implementation theory18 stresses the importance of three types of factors: institutional 
(those that stem from the characteristics and the configuration of the institutions involved), 
political-in the strict sense of the term (that is factors that regard interests, the manipulation 
                                                 
13 J. Rideau, ‘Le rôle des Etats membres dans l’application du droit communautaire’ (1972) 18 Annuaire 
Français de Droit International, pp.864-903. 
14 That is the respect for the constitutional order of each member state is respect for their individual historically-
defined traditions.   
15 J. G. March, and J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The 
Free Press, 1989). 
16 Bardach, op. cit footnote 11, p.38.   
17 Ibid, p.37. 
18 Pressman and Wildavsky, op. cit. footnote 6; Bardach, op. cit. footnote 11; C. Hood, The Limits of 
Administration (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976); L. Gunn, ‘Why Is Implementation So Difficult? (1978) 33 
Management Services in Government 4, pp.169-76; R. Montjoy and L. O’Toole, ‘Toward a Theory of Policy 
Implementation: An Organizational Perspective’, (1979) 39 Public Administration Review 5, pp.465-76; P. 
Sabatier and D. Mazmanian, ‘The Conditions of Effective Implementation: A Guide to Accomplishing Policy 
Objectives’ (1979) 5 Policy Analysis 4, pp.481-504.   
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of power and choice between competing values) and substantive (i.e. factors that concern the 
nature of the objective pursued)19.  Institutional factors primarily include the number and the 
strength of decision points that implementation has to go through, the existence of strong co-
ordinating mechanisms promoting integrated and harmonious action of the implementing 
institutions, the position that the implementation of a programme occupies in their internal 
hierarchy of tasks and the involvement of well-resourced and sympathetic implementing 
institutions.  Political factors include the support of the target group, the continuous support 
of the political promoters of a programme and the existence of ‘fixers’, that is actors who are 
willing and powerful enough to intervene at critical moments of the implementation process 
by taking corrective action.  Finally, substantive factors include the tractability of a policy 
problem, the theory that is incorporated in a programme and the specificity of a policy 
mandate, our understanding of the problem in question and the expertise that is necessary for 
the effective implementation of a programme.   
 
B Institutional Factors 
 A number of institutional factors both at the level of the EU and in the member states 
affect transposition.  Like the wider implementation process, transposition starts in the stage 
of policy formulation when a number of key choices are made.  The content of directives is 
frequently vague (‘fudges’20) as a result of political compromises that occur in formulation.  
‘By the time a directive is adopted, it is far too late.  There is very little you can do to put it 
right afterwards’ as one official put it21.  Member states try to score a ‘national home run’22-
that is the adoption by the EU of their own national policy framework.  This is so because a 
‘home run’ minimises that country’s adjustment costs.  However, as national policy traditions 
are not necessarily compatible with each other, conflict can lead to compromise which rests 
on unclear texts.   
 The institutional configuration of the EU is particularly prone to the production of 
sub-optimal policies23 embodied in unclear legislation.  This is so because the European 
Commission and Parliament on the one hand and the Council of Ministers on the other, 
reflect different institutional logics (pro-integrationist in the cases of the former and 
intergovernmental in the case of the latter).  Although the two logics aren’t necessarily 
incompatible with each other, their co-existence is an uneasy one.  Indeed, it doesn’t 
constitute a good starting point for the formulation of clear and implementable public policy 
because the two groups of institutions try to promote two conflicting sets of objectives at the 
same time.  On the one hand, the representatives of the member states in the Council aim to 
resolve common problems while maintaining their relative autonomy.  On the other hand, the 
Commission and the Parliament promote the expansion of EU competence along with 
specific policy objectives which do not necessarily coincide with those of the Council.  In 
addition, the Council tends to avoid votes even when qualified majority voting can be used.  
This practice is frequently combined with the Commission’s tendency to avoid the creation of 
minorities in the Council of Ministers by trying to maximise the individual member states’ 
views that it takes ‘on board’ when drafting a new proposal or modifying an existing one24.   
                                                 
19 These are ideal types.  In practice, it is hard to distinguish between these categories of factors because one 
can-and does-turn into the other.  Therefore, the distinction serves analytical purposes only.   
20 DTI, Review of the Iimplementation and Enforcement of EC Law in the UK (London: DTI, 1993) p.38.   
21 Interview, London, 10 July 2000. 
22 A. Héritier, ‘The accommodation of diversity in European policy-making and its outcomes: Regulatory policy 
as a patchwork’ (1996) 3 Journal of European Public Policy 3, pp.149-67. 
23 F. Scharpf, ‘Die Politikverflechtungs-Falle: Europäische Integration und deutscher Föderalismus im 
Vergleich’, (1985) 26 Politische Vierteljahresschrift 4, pp.323ff.   
24 B. Kerremans, ‘Do institutions make a difference? Non-institutionalism, neo-institutionalism and the logic of 
common decision-making in the European Union’, (1996) 9 Governance 2, pp.228-9.   
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Presidencies are another crucial source of the problem of lack of clarity.  Indeed, the 
more pending legislative a presidency manages to push through, the more successful it is 
believed to be.  Hence, officials involved in the management of presidencies often put 
pressure not only on representatives of other member states in meetings of the working 
groups of the Council, but also on departmental officials of their own country who may 
object to the use of a specific term or phrase, e.g. for reasons of legal certainty or clarity25.  
Typically, these ‘fudges’ are blamed for the use of the copy-out technique in transposition, 
whereby substantive parts of a directive are included, occasionally word for word, in the 
transposing texts (see below).   
In addition, ‘fudges’ are produced as a result of the narrow scope of the mandate 
given to national negotiators.  Typically, negotiators from member states with strong co-
ordinating mechanisms discover that they have a limited margin for manoeuvre in Council 
working groups because their mandate is frequently quite narrow.  Although the use of 
qualified majority voting26 in the Council facilitates compromises,27 since member states have 
to mobilise wider support in order to defeat a legislative proposal, the Commission’s 
inclusive tactics and consensual decision-making undermine its effectiveness.   
The institutional configuration of the EU also facilitates transposition.  As the French 
Conseil d’Etat noted28, EU law cannot be observed with scepticism and in a passive manner 
because it doesn’t ‘fall from the sky’.  The involvement of member states in policy 
formulation is crucial because it allows them to assess the changes (legislative and other) that 
will be necessary once a directive has been adopted.  The assessment of these legislative 
changes at the national level is particularly important in member states where there are a 
large number of laws in place.  When the assessment of the changes that have to be made 
after the adoption of a directive is incomplete, delays occur in transposition.  This is 
important not only when directives have short deadlines for transposition, as is frequently the 
case,29 but also in member states like the UK where the legislative output remains largely 
unaffected in quantitative terms despite membership of the EU30.   
The nature of national politico-administrative structures is another factor that affects 
transposition.  Fragmentation undermines the effective operation of politico-administrative 
machineries31.  Unlike the impact of fragmentation in the formulation stage which is marked 
by the lack or ineffectiveness of inter-departmental co-ordinating mechanisms, fragmentation 
in transposition appears primarily at departmental level.  The case of the UK is quite 
illustrative in that respect.  Unlike continental European administrations where a high 
proportion of officials are trained lawyers, in the UK there is a clear distinction in the 
operational logic of administrators, on the one hand, and departmental lawyers on the other.  
Typically, the Whitehall official has little or no legal training and tends to construe issues 
regarding transposition as ‘technical’ while the insistence of lawyers on specific terms or 
phrases during the process of negotiation seems to be construed as little less than obstruction.  
                                                 
25 Interview, London, 10 July 2000. 
26 The view that the use of QMV undermines the efforts to draft clear legislation at the level of the EU is met 
with some scepticism by some officials.  They argue that QMV has facilitated the adoption of too many EU laws 
(interview, Paris, 21 July 2000).   
27 National officials acknowledge that QMV has increased the unwillingness of national representatives in 
Council meetings to being part of minorities, even when they remain unconvinced as to the substance of a 
legislative proposal (interview, Dublin, 14 June 2000).   
28 Rapport Public 1991, Etudes et documents No. 43 (Paris: La Documentation française, 1991) p.15.   
29 This is another choice made in the stage of policy formulation, largely due to the willingness of member states 
to give effect to measures that they expect to be beneficial for them.   
30 E. C. Page, ‘The Impact of European Legislation on British Public Policy Making: A Research Note’ (1998) 
76 Public Administration 4, pp.803-9. 
31 See Hood, op. cit. footnote 18.   
- 5 - 
Although departments are instructed to involve lawyers in negotiations32 this view is met 
with hostility by administrators.  This hostility is also mirrored at the organisational level by 
the existence of a separate hierarchy for the two groups of officials which re-produces the 
different mentalities.   
Although the role of lawyers in Whitehall can be construed as a ‘peculiarity’ of the 
British system, it raises another wider issue.  This issue has two dimensions, one national, 
that is the profile of the civil servants involved in the management of EU business that stems 
from a novel legal order33 and one European, namely the role of the Legal Service of the 
European Commission in the formulation stage.  The profile of the national civil servants has 
evolved slowly.  The case of France is quite illustrative in that respect.  Until the late 1980s 
the Ecole Nationale d’Administration did not offer courses on EC law34.  This has changed 
since 199035.  Further, the weak involvement of the Legal Service of the Commission in the 
formative stages of the directives isn’t conducive to clarity.  In a sense, the Commission desk 
officers share with presidencies the same objective, i.e. getting the directive through Council 
and Parliament, although the quest for ‘a result’ is not necessarily conducive to a clear and 
easily transposable (and implementable) directive.   
Intra-departmental and inter-departmental mobility of officials is another source of 
problems in transposition.  Although mobility is an essential tool for the management of 
human resources in public administrations, it also produces unintended consequences both in 
southern and northern member states.  Officials move on to other posts after the end of the 
frequently protracted negotiations and the adoption of a directive.  Hence, their experience 
and knowledge aren’t directly (and certainly not easily) accessible to the officials who 
replace them.  This, in turn, negatively affects the capacity of public administrations to learn 
from the precious experience acquired during negotiations36.   
 In addition, the daily workload of officials affects transposition at departmental level.  
The involvement of the same officials in the domestic stage of policy formulation (entailing 
consultations with other departments and interest groups), negotiations in Brussels and the 
transposition of EU legislation in addition to other-purely domestic-tasks is a kind of double-
edged sword.  On the one hand, when the same officials deal both with negotiations and 
transposition, the result of the latter is more likely to reflect the true objective of the directive 
(provided that other sources of distortion do not intervene).  On the other hand, the 
involvement of the same officials in both stages of the policy process substantially increases 
their workload and this is a factor that accounts for some delays.  This isn’t a problem faced 
only by new member states like Sweden where a recent government report has estimated that 
a significant increase of staff dealing with EU business (including transposition) is needed for 
the management of EU business37.  On the contrary, the lack of properly trained staff and the 
negative impact of mobility affect transposition in Greece, France and Ireland as well38.   
                                                 
32 Cabinet Office/Regulatory Impact Unit, The Guide to Better European Regulation (London, n.d.), p.26. 
33 J. Rideau, Droit Institutionnel de l’Union et des Communautés Européennes (Paris: LGDJ, 1994). 
34 Conseil d’Etat, La formation des fonctionnaires en droit communautaire: Extraits d’une étude de la Section 
du rapport et des études sur la formation juridique des fonctionnaires (1988) Revue Française d'Administration 
Publique 48, p.68. 
35 C. Lequesne, ‘L’administration centrale de la France et le système politique européen: mutations et 
adaptations depuis l’Acte unique’ in Y. Mény et al (eds.) Politiques Publiques en Europe (Paris: L’Harmattan. 
1995), p.147.  
36 Interviews, Athens and London, April and July 2000.   
37 Interview, Stockholm, 16 June 2000. 
38 N. Travers, ‘Rapport irlandais’ in FIDE, Les Directives Communautaires: Effets, Efficacité, Justiciabilité. 
XVIIIème Congrès, Stockholm, 3-6 June 1998, p.310; J. de Clausade, L’adaptation de l’administration 
française à l’Europe. Rapport au Ministre d’Etat, Ministre de la Fonction Publique et des Réformes 
Administratives, et au Ministre des Affaires Européennes (Paris: La Documentation française, 1991) p.68; A. 
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National authorities that transpose EU law do so within a wider context which is 
marked by the presence of two institutionalised fixers: the ECJ and the European 
Commission.  Both the impact of the jurisprudence of the ECJ on the process of transposition 
and the role of the European Commission as gatekeeper of legality in the EU are filtered 
through (a) national courts and (b) the cost of litigation.  National courts have broadly 
accepted in principle and enforced in practice the concept of state liability for non-
transposition or incorrect transposition of EU law.39  Nevertheless, Francovich is conditional.  
These conditions aren’t always met by EU directives.  Essentially it is hard to establish 
whether the impact of the jurisprudence of the ECJ in these cases (a) has reached non-lawyers 
in national administrations and (b) can supersede (or has done so already) other factors that 
undermine effective transposition of EU legislation.  Moreover, litigation can be both 
expensive and time-consuming.  Therefore, the impact of the jurisprudence of the ECJ on the 
activity of national administrations also depends on the ability and willingness of economic 
operators to take up these costs.   
 
C Political Factors 
There are two ways in which politics (in the strict sense of the term) affects 
transposition.  First, outright rejection of a directive or group of directives can be politically 
motivated but such a position is becoming increasingly untenable in light of the 
Commission’s role as gatekeeper of legality in the EU and the increasing limits placed on the 
institutional autonomy of the member states by the jurisprudence of the ECJ (see below).  
Therefore, the impact of politics upon transposition takes more covert forms.  Member states 
can facilitate, delay or undermine transposition (and, indeed, implementation) by means of a 
number of choices that they make.  Faced with an unclear text, national officials can either 
copy40 it into national law thus effectively leaving unresolved the issue of clarity or elaborate 
by trying to facilitate subsequent steps in the implementation chain.   
In the first case, officials who draft national texts effectively pass the buck-a cop-out 
in Ramsey’s terms41-both to street-level implementors and the economic operators who must 
comply with or benefit from these provisions.  On the contrary, those who take a bolder 
stance, try to interpret the directive, in an attempt to facilitate street-level implementation.  
This, however, entails a twofold risk: ‘over-implementation’ (i.e excessive) and ‘under-
implementation’ (i.e. deficient transposition).  While ‘over-implementation’ entails the use of 
concepts, obligations, mechanisms and procedures that were never meant to be a part of the 
directive, ‘under-implementation’ entails the omission of crucial aspects of the directive thus 
undermining effectiveness.  However, only a fine line distinguishes between ‘over-
implementation’ and ‘under-implementation’.42  What constitutes ‘over-implementation’ and 
what ‘under-implementation’ is much more than a ‘technical’ choice (i.e. the selection of the 
right legal terms and mechanisms).  The terms ‘over’ and ‘under’ implies the existence of a 
barrier which serves as the mechanism for a test.  How high this barrier is, is defined on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Passas and A. Makridimitris, The Greek Government and the Co-ordination of European Policy (Athens: A. N. 
Sakkoulas, in Greek, 1994), pp.59-60.  
39 FIDE, Les Directives Communautaires: Effets, Efficacité, Justiciabilité. XVIIIème Congrès, Stockholm, 3-6 
June 1998.  Novelty consists in the application of the already existing principle of state liability in non-
transposed and incorrectly transposed EU law.   
40 Copy-out is also used in cases of very precise and detailed directives, such as the directives on public 
procurement, that effectively restrict the choices that national officials can make.   
41 L. Ramsey, ‘The copy out technique: More of a ‘cop-out’ than a solution’ (1996) 17 Statute Law Review 3, 
p.218ff.   
42 This is why some national officials admit that the advantage of the copy-out technique is that it can lead to 
legal challenges in courts (national and European) whereby the content of the directive is clarified (interview, 
London, 10 July 2000).   
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basis of political factors which are linked not only to the interests affected by the specific 
case in question but also by wider considerations, for example perceptions regarding 
membership of the EU.  The ‘symbolic implementation’ envisaged by the Conservative 
government in 199643 with regard to the directive on the 48-hour working week that it had 
fiercely opposed in the Council of Ministers and in the ECJ and its linkage to the then on-
going intergovernmental conference that led to the Amsterdam Treaty illustrates that 
transposition (and implementation for that matter) are used as political arguments at the 
highest political level in the EU.   
Secondly, more mundane choices that never reach this level of publicity are equally 
political because they affect the interests of target groups and reflect the priorities of those 
that make them.  The operationalisation of abstract concepts incorporated into EU directives 
largely relies on significant choices made during transposition, including the distribution of 
the regulatory burden.  The transposition in UK law of the directive on part-time work is an 
example of this phenomenon.  The directive in essence provides for the equal treatment of 
full-time and part-time employees.  This presupposes a means of assessment, in this case a 
mechanism for comparing the two categories of employees.  However, UK draft legislation 
that transposes the directive in question reportedly44 does not contain such a mechanism thus 
effectively obliging interested individuals to rely on litigation for the protection of their 
rights.   
Deciding whether to hold consultations with the Commission in transposition is 
another seemingly mundane decision.  The European Commission is seen as an unhelpful and 
occasionally unreliable source of assistance in the transposition stage.  This criticism 
concerns the attitude of Commission officials with regard to the provision of clarifications 
rather than the deadlines for the transposition of directives.  Although national officials do 
not show great zeal in contacting the Commission in order to clarify issues during the process 
of transposition, when they do so they claim that help is not forthcoming45.  Clearly, a lot 
depends on the manner in which questions are asked and the availability of staff and time.  In 
other words, it may well be the case that when their duties allow Commission officials to be 
available46 for answering questions regarding transposition, they are unwilling to answer 
because they feel that their answers can be used as the means to justify choices which are not 
compatible with the spirit and the letter of EU law.  Further, answers of lower-ranking 
Commission officials have (in the past) been over-ruled by their superiors.47  The decision 
regarding consultations with the Commission is a political one.  One national official 
questioned its usefulness by stating that if one is looking for an ‘objective’ (i.e. correct) 
interpretation of a directive, then ‘this is a stupid thing to do because there is no objective 
interpreter of the law’48.  Further, raising an issue with the Commission ensures that its 
officials will focus on the choices ultimately made by the member state in question.   
At the domestic level, the choice of national legislative instrument is equally a 
political one.  Individual ministerial styles affect this choice.  A bill is certainly a useful tool 
                                                 
43 The Guardian, 12 November 1996.   
44 Financial Times, 4 July 2000.   
45 Interviews, London, Paris and Stockholm, June and July 2000. 
46 A national official who has also worked for the European Commission argued that Commission officials find 
it much more useful to concentrate on issues regarding street-level implementation rather than answering 
questions about transposition (interview, London, 31 July 2000).   
47 Nevertheless, it is important to note that this contrasts with their behaviour in street-level implementation.  
Indeed, the Commission then becomes not only a natural and effective focal point for national civil servants 
who seek and obtain advice as to how to go about implementing EU policy but also a useful resource in the 
hands of economic operators.   
48 Interview, London, 31 July 2000. 
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in the hands of an attention-seeking minister.  Nevertheless, in the case of the UK where the 
issue of membership is contentious, the very extensive delegation of legislative power to the 
government contained in section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 has been 
designed in an effort to neutralise, or at least sideline, Westminster which could otherwise 
function as a useful forum for those who oppose membership.  The implications of the use of 
secondary legislation for the transposition of EU law into national legislation, a typical part 
of the European style of transposition (see below) are essentially fourfold.   
First, the visibility of rules is undermined as more than one legal texts have to be 
consulted by those pursuing professional activities in the said domain, including street-level 
implementors.  Secondly, the use of secondary legislation facilitates what Weatherill49 called 
‘bolt-on transposition’, that is the incorporation of EU law by means of separate legal 
instruments, rather than the codification of legislation in a single comprehensive instrument.  
This is particularly important in member states where legislative output isn’t affected in 
quantitative terms by membership of the EU50 because it obscures the visibility of EU law by 
rendering it only one of many pieces of legislation that users must consult or comply with.  
Bolt-on transposition in turn allows the creation of an artificial distinction between EU-
derived and purely national law.  At least in the UK, this practice reflects the view, widely 
held by administrators in Whitehall, that EU legislation and the law that transposes it should 
be kept apart from ‘proper’ (i.e. UK) legislation51.   
Thirdly, the balance of power between parliaments and executives is further altered in 
favour of the latter.  Finally, the use of government (i.e. secondary) legislation also reflects a 
wider pattern of ‘depoliticisation’ of transposition which is more apparent than real.  The 
limited direct involvement of ministers in the drafting of secondary legislation means that 
they are less likely to play the role of ‘fixer’ in transposition.  For ministers know that it is 
hard, if not impossible, to make political capital by means of correct and timely transposition 
of EU law.  This doesn’t undermine the political nature of transposition.  Ministers avoid 
declaring openly that they have blocked the transposition of a directive not only because it 
reduces their bargaining power vis-à-vis the Commission but also because this would go 
against the co-operative culture that underpins decision-making in the Council, as illustrated 
by the longer adaptation periods accorded to member states who need them.  This is also why 
the politics of transposition is predominantly defensive.   
In turn, the implications of ‘depoliticisation’ are threefold.  On the one hand, the 
balance of political power between elected and unelected officials shifts in favour of the 
latter.  On the other hand, the administration becomes the main focus of groups that seek to 
undermine the effectiveness of EU law.  This pressure on the administration inevitably 
highlights the problems stemming from the increasing workload and the mobility of officials 
discussed in the previous sub-section.  Finally, since ministers are less likely to act as fixers, 
the role of the Commission as gatekeeper of legality becomes more important as well, 
especially for groups that are unable or unwilling to take national authorities to courts.   
To be sure, the extent of involvement of ministers depends on the political salience of 
the issue in question for the domestic political arena.  Domestic opponents of EU legislation 
(or membership) frequently use transposition in order to reiterate their views.  This can lead 
to delays or even non-transposition.  The cases of (a) Sweden where things tend to be ‘done 
with the left hand’ (i.e. the process ‘slows down a bit’) and more care is taken during 
consultations52 when a directive concerns a politically salient issue and (b) Greece where in 
                                                 
49 S. Weatherill, ‘Rapport Britannique’ in FIDE, Les Directives Communautaires: Effets, Efficacité, 
Justiciabilité. XVIIIème Congrès, Stockholm, 3-6 June 1998, p.126.   
50 See E. C. Page, op. cit. footnote 30.   
51 Interview, London, 10 July 2000.   
52 Interviews, Stockholm, 15-16 June 2000.   
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the early 1980s ministers deliberately delayed the management of EU business-including 
transposition53 as a result of their pre-electoral pledges, are quite illustrative in that respect.   
 
D Substantive Factors 
Formulation also affects the process of transposition by means of the introduction of 
new concepts that are alien to the legislation of the member states.  This occurs because of 
technological progress or even as a result of the development of new market practices.  For 
example, the notions of service contracts and concessions contracts in public procurement 
reflected new market practices and were new to the legislation of a number of member states.  
As a consequence, some of them chose to copy-out the content of directives into national 
legislation hoping that the Commission and the courts would clarify any remaining issues at a 
later stage of the implementation chain.  Moreover, even when these barriers don’t exist, 
transforming vague statements of political intentions into effective legislation is by no means 
an easy task54.   
 The density and content of existing national legislation is a significant substantive 
factor that affects transposition by obliging national authorities to choose between bolt-on 
transposition and the incorporation of EU law into existing legislation.  Frequently, domestic 
legislation rests on sensitive political compromises mirrored both by its scope and focus.  In 
political terms it is significantly easier to expand policies (and the legislation upon which 
they rest) than to scale them down55.  The scope and the focus of national legislation 
frequently differ substantially from those introduced by EU legislation.  For example, while 
one may regulate the behaviour of the manufacturer, the other may focus on retailers.56  
Incorporating these changes challenges the political compromise upon which national laws 
rest.  This is one reason why the Commission, national governments and groups place 
increasing emphasis on consultations prior to the submission of formal legislative proposals 
at EU level.   
 
III The Potential and Limits of Institutional Autonomy 
A Institutional Autonomy in Context 
The principle of institutional autonomy was enunciated by the ECJ in the early 1970s; 
it stated that ‘when provisions of the Treaty or of regulations confer power or impose 
obligations upon the States for the purposes of the implementation of Community law, the 
question of how the exercise of such powers may be entrusted by Member States to specific 
national bodies is solely a matter for the constitutional system of each State’57.  The ECJ has 
subsequently refined this principle through its jurisprudence.  In an effort to increase 
effectiveness, the ECJ has tried to limit the freedom of national authorities to utilise 
institutional autonomy in order to undermine transposition and implementation58.  National 
authorities are obliged to choose the most effective, legally binding form of measures ensuring 
maximum publicity.  Further, the measures used for transposition must take the same form as 
those used for the regulation of the same issue in a given member state.  Hence, the 
jurisprudence of the Court has restricted the capacity of national authorities to utilise 
institutional autonomy in order to undermine transposition.  More importantly, the ECJ has 
                                                 
53 Interview, Athens, 7 April 2000.   
54 R. Rose, ‘Law as a resource of public policy’ (1986) 39 Parliamentary Affairs 3, p.309.   
55 Ibid, p.307.   
56 The different scope and focus is an additional factor that explains why transposition is unnecessary only in 
exceptional circumstances.   
57 Joined cases C-51 to C-54/71 International Fruit Company NV and Others v. Produktschap voor Groenten en 
Fruit. Reports of cases before the Court of Justice of the European Communities [1971] p.1107.   
58 See Rideau, op. cit. footnote 33, pp.106-8.   
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explicitly rejected the view that member states can invoke special circumstances in order to 
avoid transposition (and implementation) because their involvement in the deliberations of 
the Council enables them to assess the implications of a draft piece of EU legislation and to 
make the appropriate provisions59.   
In addition to these procedural constraints placed on the role of the member states in 
transposition, substantive limits have appeared as well.  The direct effect of directives-that is 
the conditional right of individuals to invoke directives in national courts-has limited their 
difference vis-à-vis regulations60 which needn’t be transposed, thus rendering the use of 
copy-out more likely.  Further, directives have become increasingly technical and detailed 
thus effectively curtailing the freedom of national authorities in the process of transposition.  
Despite these limitations, member states make significant procedural choices.  The following 
sub-section describes broad trends identified in eight member states.61   
 
B A European Style of Transposition? 
The transposition of EU law is achieved predominantly in a reactive manner by 
means of secondary legislation, which reflects the dominant role of national governments, 
marked by the limited direct involvement of ministers.  It is the result of multiple co-
ordination of a small number of departmental actors operating at the level of central 
government and is underpinned by a variable degree of group involvement.  In terms of 
legislative technique, national authorities combine elaboration with ‘copy-out’ and ‘bolt-on’ 
transposition with the incorporation of changes into existing legislation.   
The choice of the national legislative instrument is both straightforward and 
unproblematic in the member states examined here, essentially for two reasons.  On the one 
hand, national constitutions define the policy areas covered by law and those covered by 
secondary legislation.  On the other hand, constitutions provide for the delegation of 
legislative powers from national parliaments to governments.  Thus, governments typically 
make extensive use of secondary legislation for the transposition of EU directives.  The main 
reason is the lourdeur of parliamentary procedures and the lack of parliamentary time.  This 
pattern has replaced in some member states, such as the UK and France, the use of 
administrative circulars62 previously used for the transposition of EU law.  The jurisprudence 
of the ECJ63 has highlighted the fact that circulars, unlike legislation, do not provide for legal 
certainty and cannot ensure publicity since they largely remain a means of intra- and inter-
departmental communication.   
However, laws are used for the transposition of EU legislation in exceptional cases for 
legal and practical reasons.  Domestic constitutional arrangements oblige governments to use 
primary legislation is a small number of cases.  For example, an act of parliament is 
necessary in the UK when the transposition of EU legislation involves the creation of new 
criminal offences entailing major penalties.  Moreover, laws are used when the legislative 
process is already under way at the national level in an attempt to regulate other aspects of 
                                                 
59 Case 30/72 Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic. Reports of cases before the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities [1973]: 161.   
60 F. Capotorti, ‘Legal problems of directives, regulations and their implementation’ in H. Siedentopf and J. 
Ziller (eds.) Making European Policies Work, vol. I, (Bruxelles/London: Bruylant/Sage, 1988) p.154.   
61 Clearly, additional research based on case studies is necessary if a higher degree of detailed knowledge is to 
be achieved.   
62 J. Usher, ‘The legal framework for implementation in the United Kingdom’ in T. Daintith (ed.) Implementing 
EC Law in the United Kingdom: Structures for Indirect Rule (Chichester: Wiley & Sons, 1995) p.101; R. Kovar, 
P. Lagarde, D. Tallon, ‘L’éxécution des directives de la CEE en France’ (1970) 6 Cahiers de Droit Européen 3, 
p.288.   
63 Rideau, op. cit. footnote 33, pp.106-7.   
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the same policy area.  This is a rather rare phenomenon.  Hence, transposition is 
predominantly reactive.   
The impact of this pattern on the relations between national legislatures and 
executives is a crucial issue with two basic facets.  On the one hand, the weak role of national 
parliaments in transposition underlines the so-called democratic deficit that characterises the 
domestic dimension of the EU policy process.  On the other hand, however, it isn’t the direct 
result of the participation of member states in the process of integration.  In most, if not all, of 
the polities examined here, the weakness of parliaments pre-dates the creation of the EC (or 
at least the most intensive stages commenced by the Single European Act).  The case of 
France where most of the policy areas where the EC/EU is active were already excluded from 
the legislative domain64 is quite illustrative in that respect.  At best, the involvement of 
national polities in European integration–and the transposition of EU law in particular-may 
have highlighted an established pattern of formal legislative-executive relations (or enhanced 
it) whereby the former dominates the latter.  Nevertheless, the exigencies of transposition, in 
particular the deadlines and the legally binding nature of the directives, have effectively 
enhanced the role of governments vis-à-vis parliaments-and domestic groups (see below)-in a 
covert manner.  Determined executives can, and do, evoke these characteristics of directives 
in order to push through EU-induced legislative changes.   
The choice of the form of national legislation by means of which EU law is 
transposed is only one, and possibly the simplest, choice made by national authorities but the 
use of secondary legislation reflects a wider pattern of ‘depoliticisation’ of the EU policy 
process.  The increasing use of secondary legislation, typically prepared by civil servants, 
reflects the dominant role of the same officials in the policy formulation stage.  
‘Depoliticisation’ refers not only to the limited role played by formally responsible ministers 
in practice, but also the inability and unwillingness65 of national parliaments to play a 
substantive role in transposition.66  It doesn’t imply that the role of civil servants isn’t 
political.  Rather, the term ‘depoliticisation’ reflects a pattern of limited direct and overt 
involvement of elected officials in transposition.   
Typically, the departments that have a stake in the transposition of a directive are 
identified in the formulation stage of the policy process.  Their activity takes place in a 
framework characterised by multiple forms of co-ordination.  One can distinguish between 
two forms of co-ordination: substantive and legal.  Substantive co-ordination focuses on the 
content of national legislation that transposes EU law and aims to resolve differences of view 
between departments.  It is the domain of core executive bodies (such as the SGCI and the 
SGG in France and the Prime Minister’s Unit in Sweden) or ministries of economic affairs 
(in Greece, the Netherlands, and Germany) whereas in Italy-a unique case-the main co-
ordinator is the Ministry for the Co-ordination of EU Policies.  Legal co-ordination focuses 
on the compatibility of new legislation with the jurisprudence of the ECJ and other aspects of 
EU legislation, constitutional provisions and other aspects of domestic law.  Legal co-
ordination is either the domain of legal bodies like the Conseil d’Etat in France and similar 
                                                 
64 Y. Mény, ‘France’ in H. Siedentopf and J. Ziller, . Making European Policies Work, vol. II 
(Bruxelles/London: Bruylant/Sage, 1988) p.282.   
65 The cases of Westminster and the Irish Parliament where deputies do not scrutinise national legislation that 
transposes EU law are illustrative in that respect.   
66 The French government has used the services of MPs, including the former Prime Minister Michel Rocard, on 
three occasions.  MPs act as mediators between the administration and competing interest groups in the 
transposition of directives relating to politically sensitive issues, such as the liberalisation of the gas market.  See 
for example N. Bricq, Mission de réflexion et de concertation sur la transposition de la directive européenne sur 
le marché intérieur du gaz. Rapport au Premier ministre (Paris, La Documentation Française, 1999).  However, 
they do so without fettering the role of the government that remains the dominant institutional player (interview, 
Paris, 21 July 2000).   
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institutions in Italy, the Netherlands and Greece or departments (like the ministries of justice 
in Sweden, the Attorney General’s Office in the UK and Ireland).  These forms of co-
ordination are intertwined and combined with (a) sectoral foci of co-ordination such as the 
DTI in the UK and the Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands which co-ordinate the 
transposition of Single Market directives and (b) the assessment of the ‘political’ 
repercussions of the state of play with regard to transposition, typically the domain of 
ministries of foreign affairs.   
The involvement of interest groups in the process of transposition reflects their role in 
the policy formulation stage.  A distinction between two groups of member states can be 
drawn.  First, in the UK, Ireland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany where interest 
groups are actively involved in policy formulation, they participate in the process of 
transposition as well.  Contacts between civil servants and interest groups in these member 
states serve three purposes, namely the provision of information about the substance of new 
EU legislation, consultation regarding the mode of transposition and the direction of some 
choices involved in transposition (including scope and sanctions) and legitimation of the 
process.  France is a peculiar case in the sense that the rather limited direct involvement of 
groups in policy formulation is followed by an institutionalised role law-making hence in 
transposition as well.  Secondly, in Greece and Italy the weak involvement of interest groups 
in transposition mirrors their weakness in the formulation stage.  This is one of the most 
prominent reasons for criticism against the Italian and the Greek negotiators who frequently 
ignore (not necessarily by choice) the views of economic operators and stakeholders67.   
 
IV The Evolution of National Systems and EU Efforts to Improve Transposition 
 Arguably, the European style of transposition outlined above isn’t the result of a 
process of convergence.  Rather, national systems have adapted to the exigencies of 
transposition.  Institutional theory underlines the fact that institutions tend to approach reality, 
including novel situations, by means of their own standard operating procedures and 
repertoires68.  This is precisely what happened in the eight member states examined here.  
Very little has changed as a result of the exigencies of transposition.  In fact, only three small 
changes can be underlined.  First, some member states that in the past have used 
administrative circulars in order to transpose EU law have ceased this practice as a result of 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ.  Reverting to legally binding instruments was very easy since 
these instruments were already part of the national legislative ‘arsenal’ and were used 
extensively for domestic purposes.  Secondly, less time is being devoted to consultations with 
groups in Sweden while the Dutch General Administrative Law Act has been amended in the 
mid-1990s in a manner that leaves consultations between formal advisory boards and the 
administration at the discretion of the latter.  Its exercise depends on the extent to which the 
transposition of EU legislation enables the implementing authority to make policy choices.  
However, in both cases the fundamental characteristics of the two consensual systems have 
been maintained.   
Secondly, developments at EU level have reduced the need for change at the national 
level since EU law is under the increasing influence of the Anglo-Saxon method of drafting69 
which places emphasis on precision and clarity.  Finally, national governments are now much 
more aware of the importance of the formulation stage of the policy process.  The most 
effective national negotiators try to influence the Commission when it is drafting its 
proposals, i.e. before they reach the working groups of the Council, largely in response to the 
                                                 
67 Interviews, Athens and Rome, April and July 2000.   
68 March and Olsen, op. cit. footnote 15, pp.34-5.   
69 See Wainwright, op. cit. footnote 8, p.12. 
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increasing use of qualified majority voting which undermines the capacity of individual 
governments to block legislative proposals.   
 Efforts at the level of the EU have focused on legislative drafting and the 
consolidation of existing legislation.  The debate regarding the ‘quality of EU law’ has been 
reinvigorated after the Maastricht Treaty and the explicit introduction of the principle of 
subsidiarity into the Treaty.  Further to the conclusions of the Presidency of the European 
Council meeting in Edinburgh (December 1992) the Council has adopted a resolution which 
stressed the importance of the systematic use of consolidation, the need for consistency and 
clear and simple wording in EU law70.  The IGC that led to the adoption of the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1997 encouraged the use of official codification of legislative acts and urged the 
European Parliament, Council and the Commission to establish guidelines for improving the 
quality of drafting of EU legislation and to take the necessary internal organisational 
measures for their proper implementation (Declaration No. 39).  This led in 1998 to an inter-
institutional agreement71 on common guidelines for the quality of drafting of EU law 
emphasising the importance of clear, simple and precise drafting.  The three institutions 
decided to foster co-operation between their respective departments responsible for ensuring 
the quality of drafting, agreed to instruct their legal services to draw up a joint practical guide 
for those involved in drafting legislation and to promote co-operation with the member states 
‘with a view to improving understanding of the particular considerations to be taken into 
account when drafting texts’.  In that sense they underlined the fact that both levels of 
government must engage in processes of learning thus echoing the view of a senior 
Commission official who urged member states to ensure that individuals with drafting 
expertise are included in the national delegations that participate in the meetings of the 
working groups of the Council72.  More concrete steps have been taken in areas where 
integration has reached more advanced stages.  In the domain of the internal market the 
Commission has launched the SLIM initiative (Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market) 
in 1996.  The objective is to involve national officials, users of EU legislation and officials of 
the European Commission in an effort to avoid unnecessarily complex provisions.  However, 
only half of the simplification measures already proposed by the Commission since the 
Edinburgh European Council and only one third of its proposals on formal consolidation have 
been adopted by the Council and the European Parliament73.  If previous experience is 
anything to go by, the prospects of the successful completion of this task are not good.  
Unlike the European Parliament, the Council has undermined previous attempts to 
consolidate EU legislation.  National representatives have attempted to re-open the debate on 
substantive issues74 which consolidation is supposed to leave intact.  Hence, the impact of 
‘politics’ remains more than evident.   
 
V Conclusion 
 The objective of this article was twofold.  On the one hand, it sought to demonstrate 
that transposition is affected by institutional, political and substantive factors.  Drawning on 
                                                 
70 Council of the European Communities, Resolution of 8 June 1993 on the quality of drafting of Community 
legislation, Official Journal of the European Communities C166, 17 June 1993.   
71 Interinstitutional agreement of 22 December 1998 on common guidelines for the quality of drafting of 
Community legislation, Official Journal of the European Communities, C73, 17 March 1999.   
72 C.Timmermans, ‘How can one improve the quality of Community legislation?’ (1997) 34 Common Market 
Law Review 5, p.1249.   
73 Commission of the European Communities, Better Lawmaking 1999: Report to the European Council, COM 
(99) 562, pp.6-7. 
74 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission: Follow-up to the 
Sutherland report. Legislative consolidation to enhance the transparency of Community law in the area of the 
Internal Market, COM (93) 361, p.4.   
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implementation theory in public policy, it has demonstrated why transposition cannot be 
expected to be the smooth, linear product of the formulation stage of the EU policy process.  
Transposition, it has been argued, is political not only because the choices made by the 
member states affect subsequent stages of the EU policy process (mainly street-level 
implementation) but also because these choices per se are neither ‘neutral’ nor ‘technical’.  
Therefore, it has been argued that confining its analysis to the impact of vagueness, i.e. 
approaching the transposition of EU law merely as an issue of legislative technique (drafting) 
fails to do justice to the richness of the process that produces it (formulation) and its 
subsequent implementation at street-level.  On the other hand, since the transposition of EU 
law takes place on the basis of the principle of institutional autonomy, the article has sought 
to identify the similarities and differences between the mechanisms used in eight member 
states.  Thus, a European style of transposition has been identified.  This, it has been argued, 
isn’t the result of a process of convergence.  Rather, despite pressure stemming from the EU, 
member states have essentially preserved their institutional autonomy.   
 Both conclusions are preliminary.  Additional work based on case studies is necessary 
if we are better to understand a stage of the EU policy process that political scientists have 
largely neglected.   
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